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## EXHIBIT 5

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MR. NATHAN: Good morning, your Honor, Aaron Nathan,

Willkie Farr & Gallagher, for plaintiffs and receivers, Ruby

Freeman and Wandrea Moss. I'm joined by my colleagues, Michael

Gottlieb, Meryl Governski, and Annie Houghton-Larsen, also of

Willkie Farr.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. CAMMARATA: Joseph Cammarata, Cammarata & De Meyer P.C., 456 Arlene Street, Staten Island, New York 10314, for the defendant, Rudolph W. Giuliani.

THE COURT: Good morning, and welcome to the case, Mr. Cammarata.

MR. CAMMARATA: Thank you.

MR. CARUSO: Good morning, your Honor, Kenneth Caruso.

THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Caruso.

MR. LABKOWSKI: Good morning, your Honor, David Labkowski.

THE COURT: Good morning.

And I see we have got Mr. Giuliani here. Welcome, sir.

We have got a number of matters before the Court.

It appears to me that the first matter that I should handle, unless there is an objection, is the motion of Mr. Caruso and his colleague to withdraw as counsel.

Any objection to me handling that as first order of

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2 MR. NATHAN: No, your Honor.

3 MR. CAMMARATA: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Is there any objection from Mr. Giuliani to the substitution of counsel?

MR. CAMMARATA: There is not, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Giuliani.

MR. GIULIANI: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Cammarata, I am going to hear from you later with respect to your request for an extension, but if I do not grant that, I want to be sure that you're still in the case and that you will be in court on the 16th in that event, if I allow Mr. Caruso to withdraw.

Can I be confident with respect to that?

MR. CAMMARATA: Yes, your Honor. My client and I will comply with all orders of the Court.

THE COURT: Including to be present on the 16th of January.

MR. CAMMARATA: Yes. If the application is denied.

THE COURT: And then the other question that I have got is really addressed to Mr. Caruso.

Mr. Caruso, I've been going through your application of whether there exists good cause for you to withdraw. I've got questions about that, which I would address in camera in the robing room if you're still pressing that.

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It was not clear to me from the papers whether, given that there is a substitution of counsel and given the assurance that I just received from Mr. Cammarata, that if I decide to go forward on the 16th, he and his client will be here, whether I actually need to address the question of good cause. I don't think that it's quite supported on the papers before me.

What's your position, sir?

MR. CARUSO: If the Court is going to grant this application on consent, based on Mr. Cammarata's representation, then there is no need for the Court to address that issue.

THE COURT: Mr. Nathan, do you agree with that?

MR. NATHAN: Well, plaintiffs are not in a position to give that consent absent the assurance that Mr. Cammarata and his client are prepared to stick to the schedule as ordered by the Court. Sounds like we are halfway there.

I think the question of whether that extension will be granted on the basis that new counsel has appeared is still on the table. I think what we would need to hear from Mr.

Cammarata is that his new arrival to the case won't be treated as a basis for further extension requests, because plaintiffs would object to that.

THE COURT: I should make it clear, before I hear argument with respect to that, Mr. Cammarata, that in a series of cases I have held that the appearance of new counsel is not

itself a basis for an extension. I have held that way back in a case called *Furry Puppet*, a case called *Cheng*, another case called *In Re Elysium Health-Chromadex Litigation*.

The proposition is sort of an obvious one, which is that requests for extension may be supportable under Rule 16, but you can't contrive a basis for an extension by changing counsel.

I assume you understand that proposition of law and that doesn't change the answer that you just gave me.

MR. CAMMARATA: I do, your Honor. However, I would like to be heard on it before your Honor today.

THE COURT: I will give you that opportunity.

I am going to grant the application of Mr. Caruso and his colleague to withdraw as counsel.

Under Local Rule 1.4, an attorney for a party may be relieved or displaced only by order of the Court. When there is no substitution of counsel, the order may be issued only upon a showing by affidavit or otherwise of satisfactory reasons for withdrawal or displacement, and the posture of the case, and whether or not the attorney is asserting a retaining or charging lien.

The movant is relieved of the obligation to submit an affidavit when there is a stipulation for substitution of counsel signed off on by the client. In this case there is such a stipulation.

Based on the record before me, I would not have found that there was good cause to warrant granting the withdrawal of counsel pursuant to the request made to me by Mr. Caruso and Mr. Labkowski. That motion was based on a claim of fundamental disagreement or an unreasonably difficult representation under Rule 1.16(c) of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct. In essence, and without disclosing the confidential communications submitted to me, the defendant took a position with respect to his participation in discovery that appears to have raised issues with respect to fundamental disagreement or unreasonably difficult representation. But the Court finds that that does not itself present a fundamental disagreement.

In short, there does not appear to be an instance where there is an objection that could be made that counsel would be ethically prohibited from making to the Court with respect to discovery, there is no obstacle to counsel objecting to any of the discovery that plaintiffs seek to take, and no fundamental disagreement on the record before me would prevent counsel from lodging those objections.

It may be that the Court would reject any objections or find that they are waived and may enter an order with respect to discovery, but, in that instance, the defendant would not have a choice but to comply with the Court order or to take it up elsewhere. It would not reflect a strategic disagreement.

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The Court nonetheless finds that attorneys Caruso and Labkowski may withdraw as counsel, given that Mr. Cammarata has appeared as substitute counsel via notice of appearance signed by the defendant in compliance with Local Rule 1.4, based upon the assurances that Mr. Cammarata will be present, as well as his client, on the 16th if I deny the request for an extension.

In short, the way I read the rules is that an affidavit establishing good cause is particularly required in an instance where the substitution of counsel or new counsel would result in there being a delay in the proceedings. Furman's decision in New York v. Department of Commerce at 2019 WL 2949908 supports that proposition. But where there is no basis to believe that substitution of counsel will result in there being a delay, I find that there is no need for there to be good cause in this case.

That takes care of the first issues.

Mr. Caruso, Mr. Labkowski, you're relieved and you may remain in the gallery or you may leave. It is up to you.

> MR. CARUSO: Thank you. I'm sorry it came to this.

MR. LABKOWSKI: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Have a good day and a good Thanksgiving to both of you.

> MR. CARUSO: Same to you.

MR. LABKOWSKI: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: I think the next issue is the request for

an extension of the trial date of January 16, so I'll hear from you, Mr. Cammarata, with respect to that.

MR. CAMMARATA: Thank you, your Honor.

There are multiple reasons why I'm requesting that the trial be adjourned from the January 16 date, and the application would be for a reasonable amount of time of 30 days, as I don't believe there would be a prejudice to the plaintiff, obviously; to my client, the defendant; and to this Court.

Your Honor, this is a civil case. My client has multiple cases that he is defending against in multiple jurisdictions, such as New York, Arizona, Georgia, Colorado, and Washington, D.C. As I'm sure this Court may know, there was also a contempt motion filed against my client in Washington, D.C. that's returnable, I believe, in the middle of December.

THE COURT: Mr. Cammarata, let me interrupt you for a second just to say that don't assume that I know anything that has not been presented to me in the papers filed before me.

I'm aware that there is press that covers things having to do with your client, but I've actually tried to blind myself to that press. Anything you want me to know, tell me. Don't assume that I know something that you have not told me or the plaintiffs haven't told me.

MR. CAMMARATA: There was a contempt motion filed in

D.C. against my client that's returnable in the middle of
December, so he is defending multiple criminal cases and civil
cases in multiple jurisdictions around this country. He has to
prepare for those cases, and he has to put on a formidable
defense on those cases, as well as this one. I know this is
the case that's in front of you.

Quite frankly, your Honor, I know it's not the only component that you would consider, but this is a very strong component. I recently got on this case, about nine days ago.

I have quickly met and conferred with my client down in the State of Florida. I'm moving to get everything together as quickly as possible to comply with all the Court orders before this Court to produce document production.

I feel, and now I could say this -- I would have said it if counsel was still here -- what we have done in the last five to nine days on this case hasn't been done in the last five to nine weeks on this case.

I am still getting up to speed. I have to meet and confer with my client and prepare for a trial less than 40 days from now. I don't think there would be prejudice to this Court or to the plaintiff if it's granted.

My client --

THE COURT: Slow it down. The court reporter is trying to capture your words. I don't have a time limit on this. Take your time.

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MR. CAMMARATA: In addition to me getting up to speed and putting on an ethical and formidable defense for my client and be best prepared possible, I would need more time than the deadline that's set to start the trial on January 16. If we can move the trial to the end of January or middle of February, that would give the defendant the opportunity to properly defend himself.

My client is also requesting that the adjournment be granted based upon his involvement with the presidential inauguration that is taking place, and events are starting on the 16th and, I believe, going to the 22nd is the duration of time. My client regularly consults and deals directly with President-Elect Trump on issues that are taking place as the incoming administration is afoot, as well as inauguration events.

My client wants to exercise his political right to be there and his position of support and consultation to the new administration.

THE COURT: I realize it's somewhat inconsistent with the first point that you made about you wanting sometime personally, but with respect to the 16th, I have not conferred -- I don't know what the plaintiffs' position is, but are you available on the 13th and the 14th of January?

MR. CAMMARATA: I don't have my electronic calendar. I would have to write the Court.

MR. CAMMARATA: This has to do with property that is in the State of Florida.

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It's important for this Court to note that, on

August 5, 2024, the judgment against the defendant was recorded here and also in Florida. I believe that there was venue shopping to come to this court, and I believe that that also is creating an impediment to getting this case resolved quicker.

THE COURT: Isn't that actually now fully briefed in front of me? There is an argument on summary judgment with respect to that. My expectation is to resolve that issue expeditiously. I hear what you're saying, but I'm not sure that that provides a justification for moving the date of the 16th, does it?

MR. CAMMARATA: I could agree with the Court on that.

However, as far as my preparation is concerned, now I'm scaling back three more days on a case of this magnitude that there is a lot of work to do, considering where previous counsel has left my client. Previous counsel has left my client essentially without counsel for several weeks. I'm now picking up the pieces of previous counsel and moving this case forward.

I need more time to prepare to put on a formidable defense for my client. I am asking for the Court for a few weeks, that there would be no prejudice to plaintiffs in this matter.

Ninety percent of the property, if I'm not mistaken, has already been turned over. I just received documents from plaintiffs' counsel right now as far as affidavits and power of attorneys to get the co-op shares turned over. We are working

injunction, barring him from continuing to defame our clients in that case.

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There is a hearing on that motion scheduled for

December 12, but as far as we are concerned, that hearing is necessitated by the defendant's own conduct and shouldn't be a basis for him to procure an extension of deadlines in these cases, for the same reason that obtaining new counsel wouldn't constitute good cause.

Everything else that we have heard, other than the venue objections, which I'll get to in a moment, are arguments that are essentially derivative of counsel's appearance in this case at this late date. We don't think that constitutes good cause as a categorical matter, but certainly, in these circumstances, granting an extension of deadlines in an already compressed schedule, because the defendant apparently made some statement or demand of his former counsel that was, in their view, incompatible with their continued representation would just draw a roadmap for defendants to procure extensions under circumstances that would disrupt the efficient administration of justice more generally, and in this case would throw off a schedule that I think everyone acknowledges need to proceed expeditiously.

With respect to the venue objections, it's true we registered our judgment in Florida. We also registered our judgment here, where the defendant has not objected to personal jurisdiction or venue.

There have been abstention arguments raised in the summary judgment briefs, but no abstention argument that would

warrant intra-federal court abstention.

The argument for proceeding in Florida, to the extent it would have had any validity, which is something we could address separately if your Honor was interested in that question, has been conclusively waived under Rule 12 by the failure to raise it in the defendant's initial responsive pleading.

And then stepping back, this is a case that needs to move forward. It's a case where the defendant has already, I would say, been lackadaisical, at best, and intentionally obstructive, at worst, with respect to deadlines, and we are already in a situation where the Court has had to grant a motion to compel compliance with requests for production.

There are deadlines today for the defendant's compliance or responses to outstanding interrogatory requests and for compliance with an order granting the motion to compel. And as of this morning, pursuant to the instructions that the Court is aware of and blessed in its order on Friday, the receivers asked the defendant to either produce certain information by this hearing or explain by 3 p.m. yesterday why that would be impossible. We heard nothing by 3 p.m. yesterday and so far have received nothing in response to those directives.

This is just not a situation where, despite Mr.

Cammarata's best efforts, anything like compliance is

which, by the way, could have been brought any time, even after the trial before your Honor.

But the need to bring it now was to bombard, seek, and destroy the defendant, not give him enough time to reply to unrealistic demands, not give my client enough time to put on a defense, and, quite frankly, a request has been made to have a deposition of my client between the week of Christmas and New Year's, where it's a holiday that my client travels.

There is not enough breathing room for my client to do this trial, to defend against the contempt motion in D.C., to defend against six or seven other cases in other jurisdictions, and for me to put the defense on that that I need. There is no prejudice if an extension of time is granted.

That contempt motion, make no mistake, was placed smack in the middle of the preparation of the trial that is ordered to start on January 16. There is no statute of limitations that could have been blown if the contempt motion was brought after this trial. It's a strategic effort to get my client to defend against something that can lead to civil sanctions and potentially incarceration.

So that's where his main focus is right now. His main focus is to avoid sanctions and to avoid potential incarceration, if that is an option that the Court is willing to entertain.

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Cammarata?

1 MR. CAMMARATA: Yes, your Honor.

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You know what, my office -- there has been attempts to have my office slow down, and I'm not saying it's coming from plaintiffs' counsel, but there have been numerous threats of, get off the case, the bar is going to be notified. You are going to -- these type of things. It's important. It was echoed.

The professional rules of conduct of New York was as cited by Mr. Gottlieb essentially stating, in a letter to this Court that was published, that by virtue of me having a press conference outside of the law offices of Willkie Farr, that I might be conducting myself unethically, again, a distraction and a redirection of our --

THE COURT: Mr. Cammarata, with respect to that reference, there is no request for relief yet with respect to whether having a press conference outside of your adversary's offices is a violation of the rules of ethics, and I am not going to opine with respect to that or with respect to whether it violates other civil laws that I think we can all imagine what those laws are.

But to complain that your office is being threatened when you have a press conference outside the offices of the other law firm is kind of hard to take.

Are there any other arguments that you have got that I have not heard?

1 MR. CAMMARATA: That's it, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Anything else from you Mr. Nathan?

MR. NATHAN: Just one point about the contempt motion.

So there is no misunderstanding, the injunction that is the subject of that contempt motion was an injunction entered earlier this year in a parallel case brought after the trial verdict against Mr. Giuliani in the District of Columbia.

Ultimately, through a series of events that transpired in the bankruptcy court, the automatic stay was lifted for the purpose of the defendant agreeing to the substance of that injunction and waiving any right to appeal. The district court then entered it. That all happened in May of this year, I believe.

And the idea that we then chose the timing of the contempt motion to coincide with anything in these proceedings is just not true. That timing was occasioned by the defendant's own violations of the consent injunction just a couple of weeks ago. We responded immediately because the point of the injunction is to keep him from continuing to defame our clients. And then the Court scheduled a hearing for the 12th that Mr. Giuliani has not asked to extend or adjourn.

THE COURT: I'm prepared to rule.

The request for an adjournment of the trial and other interim dates raised by defendant's new counsel on November 15, 2024, turnover action, docket number 121 is denied for lack of

1 good cause.

By letter motion, the defendant requested that the trial currently set for January 16, 2025 be adjourned until on or after January 22, 2025. The Court construes the request as made under Rule 16, which allows an existing scheduling order to be modified "only for good cause and with the judge's consent." Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4).

Good cause in the context of the modification of a discovery schedule generally requires the movant to show that "despite due diligence, it could not have reasonably met the scheduled deadlines." Furry Puppet Studio, Inc. v. Fall Out Boy, 2020 WL 4978080 at \*1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2020). That means showing that "need for more time was neither foreseeable nor its fault in refusing to grant the continuance would create a substantial risk of unfairness to that party."

Incompatible with a finding of due diligence or factors, including "carelessness, an attorney's otherwise busy schedule, or a change in litigation strategy." *Id.* 

Finally, even after a showing of good cause, it "remains within the sound discretion of the district judge whether to grant a modification or not." *Id.* 

As a general matter, substitution of counsel alone does not constitute good cause. A party cannot restart the litigation clock by firing one counsel and hiring another. Cheng v. Via Quadronno LLC, 2022 WL 1210839 at \*4 (S.D.N.Y.

Apr. 25, 2022); In Re Elysium Health-Chromadex Litigation, ECF number 130, (Feb. 14, 2020) (denying motion for an extension based on appearance of new counsel).

Here, defendant has already sought and received multiple extensions in this matter. See turnover action, docket numbers 28, 39, 56, 92, and has missed multiple deadlines. Defendant has not shown anything close to "due diligence" with respect to the discovery schedule. Nor does defendant make any well-founded argument that a trial on January 26, 2025 leaves him with insufficient time to prepare.

Counsel makes conclusory statements that he is not able to prepare in the remaining time from today until January 16, 2025, but he provides no detail or factual basis to support that assertion.

As of right now, two very discrete issues are set for trial: The Homestead exemption issue and the ownership of the World Series rings. At most, a couple of witnesses would need to be prepared.

Plaintiffs' counsel represents that at present they believe that they only need two witnesses, one of which is the defendant, the other is the defendant's son.

The Court set these matters for trial on October 17, 2024 in the Homestead action, see docket number 47, and October 21, 2024 in the turnover action, see docket number 61. The trial has been discussed and planned for at multiple hearings.

MR. CAMMARATA: I believe that's the plaintiffs' application. I'd like to hear his application first, and then if I may respond.

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1 THE COURT: You may do so.

Mr. Aaron or your colleague.

MR. NATHAN: Thank you, your Honor.

We have sought this relief already with respect to the Homestead action, and our request now is that discovery requests served in connection with the miscellaneous enforcement proceeding be given the same treatment, that is, that all responses, objections, and productions made along with responses and objections be served within 14 days.

We have laid out in our letter motion why we believe there is good cause in these circumstances, and I think what it comes down to is that if the defendant believes that more time is required to prepare adequate responses, he is free to seek that relief from this court. And if there is a reason for it, then this Court, I presume, would grant that relief.

In these circumstances we are less than two months from trial, and the default rule, if it were held at 30 days, particularly in light of our experience with the defendant's responses to discovery requests in the Homestead action, where we have yet to receive anything, we don't think that it would be possible to efficiently prepare for trial without this expedited schedule.

So for the same reasons that we sought this relief in the Homestead action, we would ask that the Court grant it here.

1 THE COURT: Help me with one thing.

You served the information subpoenas in connection with this case, and the law gives you the authority to serve information subpoenas. Information subpoenas can call for documents or they can call for testimony. Under the CPLR, responses are due within seven days of receipt for an information subpoena for answers. For depositions initiated by information subpoenas, the window for compliance is 10 days.

Why is it that you need anything from me? Aren't those provisions self-enforcing? The CPLR indicates that they are enforceable by contempt. What are you seeking to do through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that you don't already have through the CPLR?

MR. NATHAN: That may just reflect a different understanding of what the information subpoena authorizes under 5224.

But if your Honor believes that we could achieve the same thing by deeming the request for production that we have served in connection with the miscellaneous enforcement proceeding to be served subject to that rule, and that a 10 or a seven-day deadline would then apply, we would be happy with that outcome as well.

THE COURT: Mr. Cammarata.

One more question for you, Mr. Nathan.

In terms of what's before me now, I have the assets

that were the subject of the turnover order. I have ruled on those. I have the rings, which were the subject of the turnover motion to which there is an objection. That's scheduled for trial. I have got the Homestead action, but that's in a separate civil number.

What is it that you would be seeking to do through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure other than evidence with respect to the rings? It really ties into my question about the use of information subpoenas, because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are really not what's designed to hunt for assets. It's the information subpoenas that are designed to hunt for assets.

MR. NATHAN: Understood, your Honor.

The major stone that I won't say is unturned, but at least the contents of which have not been brought before the Court in a motion for relief yet, has to do with the defendant's cash and the ways in which he and his associates have funneled cash away from his personal accounts and into LLCs that we contend are, at a minimum, designed to keep those cash assets away from creditors in an improper way. We have been stimied in our attempts to develop all the facts that would be relevant to this motion, which we would hope to be able to bring before the Court and tee up any disputed factual issues for trial on the same schedule.

The federal rules give us a little bit more nationwide

scope in investigating a scheme that now includes bank accounts opened in New Hampshire, an LLC formed in Florida, cash held in that LLC's name in Florida. We believe that the scope of the CPLR is quite broad and would give us rights to the discovery we would need.

But the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are indisputably available to us to seek discovery in any district of the United States where we believe relevant information could be found. There would be issues to be sorted out in either case, and particularly with respect to third-party discovery. That's the avenue we have chosen.

I would add, also -- this isn't news to your Honor, but we have the option, under Rule 69, to use federal or state procedures in an execution proceeding. That's just the way we have done it so far.

THE COURT: If the only issues for trial are the Homestead and the rings and part of the justification for expedited discovery is the January 16 trial, if I close the January 16 trial and just make it about rings and about the Homestead, then why would you need expedited discovery with respect to the rest, and what's the justification for that?

MR. NATHAN: I think plaintiffs are interested in proceeding as quickly as possible with respect to everything, and it has been our hope that we could tee up the cash and the money issues for trial. If the Court's view is that's not

practical at this point, of course the trial won't close the book on this enforcement proceeding until we are able to resolve those disputes.

If that's the solution, then we would just leave those issues open. I think the downside to that approach is that it could potentially lead to a second deposition of the defendant. It could also lead us down a path where we continue to be strung along by the defendant's efforts to, you know, open a new LLC as soon as the old one was frozen. We have seen that occur already in these proceedings, and the relief that we would like to seek in connection with the cash assets we hope would put a stop to that.

THE COURT: Let me turn to you, Mr. Cammarata.

Mr. Cammarata, one of my objectives has been to try to resolve the issues that are presented here expeditiously so your client only has to sit for one deposition and so that, frankly, you're done with me. As soon as the issues can be discovered, it can be done expeditiously, they are discovered, you get rulings, you do whatever you want in terms of appeal with respect to the rulings, but the matter is tried.

With that in mind, why shouldn't there be a 14-day turnaround for discovery requests? In the information subpoenas and the like, there is -- they could proceed by way of the CPLR, and that has even a shorter timetable.

MR. CAMMARATA: Your Honor, I believe the CPLR to say

that if an information subpoena is served on a party, there is a 10-day period that the party can object to the subpoena before any production.

I'm seeing that plaintiffs' counsel, in one sense, wants to use the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and sometimes the CPLR and whatever suits their need.

What I just heard from plaintiffs' counsel is that there is a laundry list of additional discovery demands that exceed the scope of this trial that's coming down the pipeline, something that in ordinary litigation would take months.

He is speaking about entities, which my client categorically denies. He speaks about entities and transfer of funds and bank accounts and associates. That sounds of something that cannot be done before this trial, and it seems that this deposition is going to go well beyond the scope of what is before your Honor in the January trial, whether it be 13th and 14th or 16th.

I would ask the Court to limit the deposition to the issues that are before the Court because this sounds like it's a continuing, ongoing fishing expedition to put my client through extensive and protracted litigation. He mentioned associates and entities, potentially bringing in other parties into this litigation in an unrealistic time frame.

My client doesn't have transportation now. His car has been taken. He has limited funds. I think it's Social

Security. There are certain disputes of assets that may be exempt under the CPLR. So if the CPLR is good for the exemptions and everything else, why are we teetering on the CPLR or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?

Discovery shouldn't be shortened. Discovery should be extended, given the litigation tactics of the plaintiffs' counsel. They have 10 attorneys working on this file.

THE COURT: Your client's claims of poverty, when there hasn't been any evidence submitted to me to support that, is not well founded. If you want to make a presentation and have your client swear under oath with respect to his assets, then I can listen to it, but it doesn't appear to me that your client is indigent.

MR. CAMMARATA: That's not what I told the Court. His transportation has been taken, and he is down to one account that he receives Social Security. I didn't claim that he's indigent. I don't want that to be before the Court at this time.

What I am claiming is that it has been -- there are accounts he cannot access, but there is litigation -- there is a litigation onslaught coming, and we are down to a few issues. We are down to a few issues. And this is going to go well beyond -- this is a year or two's worth of litigation, from what I heard from Mr. Nathan just now, that they are looking to cram into a period of time between November 26 and January 13.

If the deposition is going to be granted and they want the deposition, it should be limited to the scope of the issues before the Court. The Court has said, it is the World Series rings, the Homestead, and any property that's disputed that may be being held right now is how I perceive it. This is a fishing expedition to go further and further and bring other parties into this, simply -- if that's their wish, the trial needs to be extended.

THE COURT: You understand, Mr. Cammarata, that the implication of what you're arguing is that your client very well may be subject to a second deposition.

MR. CAMMARATA: That's not what I'm saying, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you understand that if I accept the proposition that you're arguing, and there is a request for a deposition in connection with other assets, Rule 69 provides very broad discovery, and you won't be heard to say that my client should not be subject to a second deposition. By limiting the scope of the first deposition, you are opening yourself up to a second deposition. I had tried to avoid that for you. I hear you arguing, Judge, thank you very much, but we don't need your help on this.

MR. CAMMARATA: That's not what I'm saying, your
Honor. I'm saying that to cram all of this in before this
strict trial date, it's designed to set up a failure for the

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receipt. New York CPLR 5224(a)(3). For depositions initiated by information subpoena, the window for compliance is 10 days. New York CPLR 5224(c).

The 14-day window proposed by plaintiffs is generous

in comparison to the requirements of New York state procedure
and judgment enforcement, which, as this Court has already
stated, is supposed to move expeditiously. See Reilly Practice
Commentaries. "The information subpoena of CPLR 5224(a)(3) is
designed to get information to the judgment creditor about the
scope and whereabouts of the debtor's property expeditiously.

With respect to the World Series rings, the request is well-founded for expedited discovery. Trial is scheduled for January 16. Responses are necessary to the discovery requests, both responses and objections and the production of documents, in order to satisfy that timetable.

If, based on a particular request, the defendant needs additional time, the defendant may move by letter motion for a protective order granting him additional time, but he must do so before the due date for the discovery response, not afterwards. Letter motions must comply with the Court's individual practices. Response letters are due two days later. If the letter motion is filed after the due date for discovery response, it will be disregarded. If there is no timely response to a request for a protective order, the motion for a protective order will be deemed unopposed. Consult my individual practices if you need further clarification.

With respect to topics other than World Series rings and other than the Florida Homestead, which is covered by my order in the Homestead action, those will be covered by the

CPLR compliance with which is required by law, and failure to comply with is punishable by contempt.

Discovery responses may also be served under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Rule 69 permits the parties to use alternative means of the CPLR, or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But with respect to matters other than the World Series rings and other than the Homestead, the timetable under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will apply.

This order is subject to revision should it turn out that the defendant or, for that matter, and the plaintiffs, if there are requests of the plaintiffs, seem to be foot dragging.

Information subpoenas to Mr. Giuliani, the Giuliani entities and third parties. I think this is addressed to Mr. Nathan's colleague, if I'm not mistaken, but maybe it's to Mr. Nathan.

As I read the correspondence to the Court, the motions to compel are moot, is that correct, and are there issues to raise with respect to those?

MR. NATHAN: Not at this time. We have asked that our motions be withdrawn or denied without prejudice to renewal.

THE COURT: That motion is granted. They are denied without prejudice to renewal, and I will note that on the docket.

Are there other matters that the plaintiffs have to

1 | raise with the Court?

MR. NATHAN: Your Honor, I think we have laid out in our prior correspondence with the Court the two other outstanding issues, one involving the compliance with the turnover order and the revised instructions that were delivered to the defendant on Friday following the events of the CTS and America's First Warehouse.

With respect to those instructions, I mentioned this in connection with the extension motion, but I do want to emphasize that those directives included deadlines as of this court appearance for the defendant to produce information regarding the location of certain specific assets or explain by yesterday at 3 p.m. why he would be unable to do so.

Those deadlines have both passed without compliance, and at this point the plaintiffs are in a position where we have sort of run out of patience. There has just been delay, extension, and then ultimately no compliance.

There are several other directives where the deadlines are still outstanding, but we have already crossed the threshold where the defendant has not complied with the directives. I can be more specific. That involves our requests for information regarding the specific locations of the sports memorabilia, including the Joe DiMaggio jersey, the art mentioned in the turnover order, the cash held in the Citibank account, which has yet to be wired to the plaintiffs,

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and no explanation given for why that is impossible, and the car title, which we have not received and which defendant's counsel has represented to me is not in his possession. But, nonetheless, we have not heard an explanation for why the title has disappeared and not been turned over.

THE COURT: Mr. Cammarata, as to the car title, my glance, and it was just a glance, at the Florida counterparts to the department of motor vehicles indicates that if your client lost the title paper, you can apply for a new one pretty readily. You certainly can do that in New York.

The way I hear this going, with Mr. Nathan's presentation, is that there very well may come a time where you are required to show that you actually have made substantial efforts to comply with the Court's orders. I think you understand where I'm going with respect to that. If I need to be more explicit, I will. But just a word of advice or caution, which is, if you haven't made those efforts, you may be putting the Court in a place that the Court, and I think everybody here -- the Court would rather not be in, and I'm sure that everybody here would rather not be in.

MR. CAMMARATA: My client has made efforts as far as the car is concerned, and the car has been turned over already.

THE COURT: But the car and keys without the title is really meaningless.

MR. CAMMARATA: Once we are in receipt of the title

1 | from Florida state, we will turn it over immediately.

There are also documents I received today from the plaintiff as far as a power of attorney, which I need to look at, and also for the shares of the co-op, which my client intends to execute.

Again, my client has been extremely cooperative with my advice as counsel and my direction, which prior counsel had left him in what I believe --

THE COURT: As you know, I had the application from prior counsel, and I don't accept the notion that there was cause for prior counsel to withdraw. Your client elected to have new counsel. But there wasn't cause for them to withdraw.

MR. CAMMARATA: I understand. My client was left by that counsel. He was shocked when the motion was filed. He didn't --

THE COURT: Your client is a competent person. He was the United States Attorney for this district. The notion that he can't apply for a title certificate for the car is --

MR. GIULIANI: Your Honor, I did apply for a title certificate, and I have not gotten it. And your implication that I have been not diligent about it is totally incorrect. I applied for it immediately, and I have not gotten it. What am I supposed to do, make it up myself? Every implication you make is against me, and every single one of them is wrong, and you don't let me explain my financial situation.

I'm not impoverished. Everything I have is tied up. 1 2 I don't have a car. I don't have a credit card. I don't have 3 cash. I can't get to bank accounts that truly would be mine because they have put -- they have put stop orders on, for 4 5 example, my Social Security account, which they have no right That has -- they have put stop orders on my business 6 7 accounts. I can't pay my bills. I don't have a penny that 8 isn't tied up by them. 9 THE COURT: I permitted Mr. Giuliani to speak. The

THE COURT: I permitted Mr. Giuliani to speak. The next time he is not going to be permitted to speak, and the Court will have to take action.

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He is ably represented by counsel, or he is permitted to proceed pro se. He can't have hybrid representation.

And if you want your client to take the stand and be subject to deposition, he is nodding his head, we can have him take the stand at some future proceeding.

MR. GIULIANI: Somebody has to tell the truth.

THE COURT: It won't be in lieu of a deposition.

Mr. Cammarata, what more do you have to say to me?

MR. CAMMARATA: As far as Citibank is concerned, I believe my office sent a letter to Citibank for what funds they have to release. My client cannot be held responsible if the money wasn't wired. I will follow up with Citibank.

I will deal with my client as far as following up with the title through the state. But my client has complied --

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THE COURT: We are adjourned. Thank you.

(Adjourned)

MR. CAMMARATA: Nothing, your Honor. Thank you.

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